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Creating a More Secure America Creating a More Secure America
A Moment of Reckoning iThe September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks fundamentally altered U.S. thinking about global security. The Bush Administration mobilized for a war on terror and launched an assault on Afghanistan and an invasion and occupation of Iraq. The concept of preemptive war moved to the center of U.S. doctrine. The use of military force became the primary U.S. response to an increasingly international security environment. In the aftermath of the war in Iraq the U.S. now must deal with the broader implications of preemptive military action, including its corrosive effects on the system of collective security embodied in institutions such as the United Nations and NATO; the prospect that we are entering a cycle of permanent war as we pursue "evil" regimes and face continuing terrorist threats; and an unpredictable cost in terms of American lives and U.S. taxpayer dollars. The strategy of preemptive unilateralism has aroused animosity toward the U.S. abroad and reduced international trust in American policies. It has made the country less, not more, secure. At this juncture, it seems appropriate to examine the various means of addressing global terrorism, weapons proliferation, and other threats to U.S. and international security.1 These alternatives, based on the "force of law" rather than the "law of force"--include diplomacy, preventionk deterrence, containment, and collective defense. It is time to move beyond the metaphor of war to a more sustainable and effective international policy based on engagement rather than preemption. The "National Security Strategy," released by the White House in September, 2002, redefined the threat to U.S. security as the nexus between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and the possibility of access to such weapons through failed states or rogue regimes. The greatest danger was identified as the "crossroads of radicalism and technology," the fear that terrorists aided by tyrants would acquire and use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.2 Terrorism is nothing new, but in recent decades these networks have acquired global reach and have become more lethal and agile. If 21st-century terrorists get hold of weapons of mass destruction, this devastating power will, for the first time, be available to deviant groups and individuals.3 The problem of failed states exacerbates this threat. When governments cannot maintain law and order in their territories, terrorists use the resulting power vacuum as a safe haven, much as Al Qaeda did in Afghanistan. Iraq has become a magnet for terrorists in the wake of the collapse of government and social structures following the U.S.-led invasion.4 The dangers of mass destruction terrorism are growing as the deadliest weapons proliferate. A Pentagon analysis shows 12 nations with nuclear weapons programs, 13 with biological weapons activities, 16 with chemical weapons initiatives, and 28 with ballistic missile capabilities.5 A Department of Energy commission report released before Sept. 11 concluded that, the "most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation states. . . ."6 This situation still has not been adequately addressed. It is exacerbated by unemployed scientists in the former Soviet Union who are desperate for work and could provide others with the expertise to develop nuclear weapons. The U.S. is also threatened by the longer-term effects of growing lawlessness and the increasing isolation of the country from like-minded states. American leaders have contributed to this through a penchant for unilateral action, the abrogation or disregard of international agreements, and the invasion of Iraq without UN approval. Defeating Al Qaeda and like-minded groups is the primary security objective. While the Administration has devoted substantial energy to this task, important opportunities have been missed. The U.S. has been unprepared to engage states amenable to change, whose entrance into full compliance with antiterrorism mandates could yield important dividends. Trapped by prior, tired labels of rogue states, the Administration has neither seized nor created opportunities to strike a new relationship with Iran or Syria. The recent remarkable transformation in Libya shows the value of sanctions-based diplomacy and the possibilities for reengaging even the most objectionable regimes on the basis of verified disarmament. The Administration's approach to terrorism has obfuscated the distinct environments in which terrorists operate, glossing over important differences between Al Qaeda and groups like Hamas. Winning the campaign does not require an attack on all terror groups everywhere. What is necessary is the ability to distinguish those whose terror is based on historic and possibly negotiable political struggles from those whose terror is consciously directed at the U.S. A successful campaign against terrorism will require a two-pronged strategy: coordinated international efforts to drive terrorist networks out of business, and the pursuit of foreign policies that address the grievances and conditions that motivate political extremism. Facilitating a just peace in the Middle East, accelerating multilateral approaches to restoring Iraqi sovereignty, lowering the U.S. military profile in the Arab and Muslim world, promoting representative government, funding equitable development and poverty reduction efforts--these are among the policies that can mitigate anti-American resentment and enhance global security. They need to be combined with more effective counterterrorism efforts. The metaphor of war should not blind Americans to the fact that suppressing terrorism will take years of patient, unspectacular cooperation with other countries in areas such as intelligence sharing, police work, tracing financial flows, and border controls.7 In the wake of 9/11, the U.S. helped create the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee to coordinate international law enforcement efforts, and to deny financing and safe haven for Al Qaeda and other terrorist networks. Many nations have cooperated with the U.S. on these efforts, despite differences over Iraq, because it is in their national security interest to do so. As a result of this unprecedented multilateral collaboration, the financial resources available to Al Qaeda have been reduced, and the operations of the terrorist network have been disrupted. The world community has frozen over $100,000,000 in potential terrorist financial assets. More than 3,000 suspected terrorists have been taken into custody in a wide array of countries, including the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Pakistan, and Turkey.8 U.S. efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction have foundered in recent years. The international nonproliferation regime is threatened by numerous developments: the spread of nuclear weapons to Israel and South Asia; the global nuclear arms bazaar of Pakistan's A. Q. Khan; the developing nuclear capabilities of North Korea and Iran; Russia's avowal of a first use nuclear policy; and the U.S. policy of redeveloping nuclear weapons. America is preparing to become more--not less--reliant on nuclear weapons. By declaring a readiness to use such weapons against non-nuclear threats and proposing the development of so-called bunker buster weapons, Washington is increasing nuclear dependence and lowering the threshold of potential nuclear use. The attempt to relegitimize weapons sends exactly the wrong message to potential proliferators, including Al Qaeda, and erodes U.S. and global security. Through such policies the Administration is applying a double standard that undermines the legitimacy of the nonproliferation regime. Greater efforts are needed to prevent states or rogue actors from acquiring nuclear weapons and selling them to--or having them stolen by--terrorists. The supply of nuclear weapons and other deadly technologies must be cut off at the source. The policies that the world community supported for the peaceful disarmament of Iraq--rigorous inspections, targeted sanctions, and multilateral diplomacy--can and should be applied broadly to rid the world of weapons of mass destruction. An expanded UN weapons inspection capability could be deployed wherever necessary to verify a global weapons ban. The Perils of PreemptionA strategy of preemption creates instability in the international system when other nations adopt the same principle. In October, 2002, Russia declared a policy of preemption against Chechen rebels. This boomerang effect undermines the principle of mutual respect for national sovereignty that is essential to international order. Over time, preemption weakens deterrence by encouraging countries to adopt precarious "launch-on-warning" force postures. In a crisis, nations may undertake a "race to the button" to unleash their weapons in advance of a destructive preemptive strike. Unilateral preventive action against states that try to acquire a nuclear arsenal could encourage others to accelerate weapons development to deter such attack.10 The invasion of Iraq has prompted leaders in North Korea and Iran to increase military preparedness and weapons development. Constant threats and the use of military force breeds resentment, fosters countervailing coalitions, and overburdens resources. Over the long haul, it also weakens the fabric of domestic institutions vital to democracy by unduly strengthening the Executive Branch and replacing norms of accountability and transparency with secrecy. It is important to avoid the dangers of "imperial overstretch." Empire builders in the past found that the social, economic, and military exertions required to maintain imperial dominance invariably erode the health of society. The U.S. already is the world's largest debtor nation and more dependent on foreign capital than at any time in the last 50 years. Foreign nations now have claims on the U.S. for approximately eight trillion dollars, or 80% of America's gross domestic product. Many of the challenges that the U.S. faces in the world today--terrorism, weapons proliferation, crime, global financial instability, environmental degradation, infectious diseases, poverty--are transnational in nature and cannot be resolved by acting alone. A strategy that emphasizes cooperation among nations and strengthening international institutions is essential to meeting thesechallenges and winning the campaign against terrorism. As the world's preeminent power, the U.S. must be the leader in marshaling and sustaining joint action. A cooperative strategy employs multilateral approaches in international addairs; advocated the use of American power to strengthen norms and institutions; advances efforts to combat global poverty and lawlessness; adapts and builds cooperative security arrangements; integrates former adversaries into an international system that supports shared values; emphasizes preventive diplomacy; and recognizes that, if the use of force becomes necessary, its legitimacy is enhanced by international support. Such a policy emphasizes new synergies in global law enforcement, intelligence sharing, and efforts to thwart the financing of terror. It advocates the use of U.S. power to strengthen those norms and institutions designed to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the biological and chemical weapons conventions, and the Missile Technology Control Regime. The U.S. should assist the UN Security Council in gaining more reliable access to well-trained and -equipped forces for peace-keeping and -enforcement missions. It also should take up the unfinished project of creating a permanent standing force for the UN. Rebuilding war-torn societies requires partnerships. The experiences in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and now Iraq suggest that international institutions have an important role to play in postwar transitions. Cooperative strategies are essential for advancing U.S. security interests. Cooperative or "soft" power lies in the ability to attract and persuade rather than coerce. It arises from economic and social influence, and from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies. Coercive power will remain vital in a world of nation-states jealously guarding their sovereignty, but cooperative power increasingly is important in dealing with transnational problems that require multilateral solutions.12 Addressing Root CausesEven the most effective defensive measures will not, by themselves, eliminate terrorism completely. It is also necessary to look at root causes and develop policies that lessen the motivations for political extremism. Terrorism cannot be justified and must never be excused, but it is crucial to understand and eliminate the factors that cause terrorism. The campaign against terrorism must seek to drain the swamp from which terrorists emerge, and reduce the grievances and hostilities that they exploit. This will require global leadership and engagement, especially on issues of concern to Arab and Muslim societies. A key priority is, and must remain, U.S. support for a genuine peace process in the Middle East that provides security, justice, and economic opportunity for both sides. The U.S. should also encourage reform and modernization throughout the region, not by military coercion, but via persuasion and incentives that reward regimes for becoming more open and democratic. Working to extend representative government and free-market democracy will enhance security. Democratic nations with extensive trading relations tend not to wage war on one another. Democratic governments help to build more open and productive economies, empower women, and permit a free press that educates the public and holds governments responsible for failed policies. Fostering these conditions helps to create more representative and accountable societies that are less prone to violence and political extremism. Armed conflict is often associated with joblessness and the lack of economic opportunity among young men. Terrorist leaders usually emerge from societies where political expression is limited by autocratic governments (as in most nations of the Middle East) and exclusion from political decisionmaking. Improved opportunities to participate in vibrant economic and political systems will be the key to reducing the breeding grounds for terrorism. Development aid, debt relief, and other forms of economic assistance can create jobs and increase opportunity, thus reducing the likelihood of armed conflict. Economic aid and trade incentives can also be important means of encouraging recipient nations to resolve ethnic and religious disputes and to uphold norms of democracy, tolerance, openness, and respect for human rights. Following the conflict in Afghanistan the U.S., Japan, Iran, and other nations pledged more than $4,000,000,000 to assist the transitional authority in Kabul and provide economic opportunity for the Afghan people. These pledges must be fulfilled. The U.S. has undertaken a new and costly obligation for the reconstruction of Iraq, which it must uphold. Similar large-scale economic development initiatives are needed in other nations and regions as a means of overcoming the poverty and despair that feed terrorism and armed conflict. The U.S. must build mutually beneficial trade relationships, increase direct foreign investment in the developing world, and alleviate global poverty. AIDS cases, meanwhile, which number 65,000.000 globally, will triple by 2010. the World Health Organization has asked Washington to contribute $10,000,000,000 a year, which is the annual cost of the missile defense system, to alleviate infectious diseases in struggling countries. Just as the U.S. is leading the global fight against terrorism, it must lead a worldwide campaign against poverty, hunger, and disease. The fight against terrorism is, in significant part, a struggle over hearts and minds, particularly in the Muslim world. If America wins military battles on the ground, but in the process loses the war over ideas, then the larger goal of producing a durable peace may prove permanently elusive. References have been added online to facilitate research
Notes
David Cortright is chair of the Board and Senior Fellow of the Fourth Freedom Forum in Goshen, Indiana and codirector of its Sanctions and Security Research Program. He is also director of Policy Studies at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame. He has served as consultant or advisor to various agencies of the United Nations, the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, the International Peace Academy, and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. Along with George A. Lopez he has provided research and consulting services to the Foreign Ministry of Sweden, the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, and the Foreign Ministry of Germany. He has written widely on nuclear disarmament, nonviolent social change, and the use of incentives and sanctions as tools of international peacemaking. |
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