South Asia at the Nuclear Crossroads

A Joint Publication of the Managing the Atom Project at Harvard University, the Fourth Freedom Forum, and the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame. Printed copies of this policy brief may be requested by contacting the Forum March 2001 This work was produced in part through the generous financial contribution of the United States Institute of Peace. We gratefully acknowledge this support. The opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace. Back to the publication

Executive Summary

• India and Pakistan stand at a nuclear crossroads, poised between demonstrated nuclear weapons status and the deployment of deliv-erable nuclear arsenals. The presence of nuclear weapons in the volatile and strategically located region of South Asia poses a seri-ous threat to vital U.S. regional and global interests. The Bush administration can prevent India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear competition from assuming the shape of an all-out nuclear arms race through a coherent and consistent nonproliferation policy and suitable influence strategies.

• The interim goal for the Bush administration should be to cap India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programs below the deployment threshold. However, the U.S. should also seek to persuade and pressure India and Pakistan to roll back and eventually eliminate their nuclear weapons programs.

• An arms control strategy that aims at mere risk reduction and nuclear restraint is neither feasible nor desirable. As long as India and Pakistan possess nuclear weapons, the threshold for unauthorized, accidental, or intentional use will remain dangerously low. The risk of nuclear use will increase even further if India and Pakistan opt for operational nuclear arsenals.

• Diplomatic engagement and other incentives can play a major role in convincing India and Pakistan to curb their nuclear weapons programs. However, inducements on their own will fail to influence South Asian nuclear decision makers unless they are accompanied by sanctions.

• The U.S. must retain the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons in South Asia. Toward this end, the U.S. should take tangible steps to meet its obligations under Article VI of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to advance the goal of global disarmament.