Can the UN Battle Terrorism Effectively?

From USA Today Magazine

Security Council resolutions have "mobilized states for a campaign of nonmilitary cooperative law enforcement measures to combat global terrorism." This is an extended version of the article appearing in the January 2005 issue of USA Today magazine. January 2005 By David Cortright Link to Press Release: Can the UN Battle Terrorism Effectively?

The concept of a “war on terror” may be useful as a political metaphor, but defeating Al-Qaida and like-minded groups is primarily a job for international law enforcement.¹ Al-Qaida is not a government that can be subdued by war but a diverse network of nonstate actors spread across more than sixty countries. Countering such an enemy requires cooperation among many states. This is a task for which the United Nations is well suited. Immediately after the September 11 attacks, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1373, which imposed sweeping legal obligations on all 191 UN member states. Resolution 1373 required every country to freeze the financial assets of terrorists and their supporters, deny them travel or safe haven, prevent terrorist recruitment and weapons supply, and cooperate with other countries in information sharing and criminal prosecution. Resolution 1373 mobilized states for a campaign of nonmilitary cooperative law enforcement measures to combat global terrorism.²

To monitor state compliance with these new counter-terrorism mandates, Resolution 1373 created the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), which has been described by Secretary-General Kofi Annan as the "center of global efforts to fight terrorism."³ The primary function of the CTC is to strengthen the counter-terrorism capacity of UN member states. Its mission, wrote one observer, is to "raise the average level of government performance against terrorism across the globe."⁴ The committee serves as a "switchboard," helping to facilitate the provision of technical assistance to countries needing help to implement counter-terrorism mandates. It also attempts to coordinate the counter-terrorism efforts of a wide range of international, regional, and subregional organizations within and beyond the UN system.⁵

The CTC has received high levels of cooperation from UN member states, but it has also faced significant challenges. The committee relies exclusively on reports from member states and has lacked independent means of determining whether countries are actually implementing counter-terrorism mandates. The committee has also been handicapped in its efforts to coordinate the activities of international, regional, and subregional organizations. By early 2004 a consensus emerged in the Security Council on the need to "revitalize" the CTC through the provision of additional resources and authority.{1293) These considerations led the Security Council to adopt Resolution 1535 in March 2004. The resolution created a new Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED), which significantly expanded the committee's professional staffing and enhanced its capacity to support member state implementation.

In April 2004 the Security Council further strengthened the UN counter-terrorism program by adopting Resolution 1540.⁷ The new resolution prohibited states from providing any form of support to nonstate actors that attempt to acquire nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. It mandated a series of enforcement measures that states must implement to prevent such proliferation and established a committee to report on implementation. In October 2004 the Security Council approved Resolution 1566, in response to the school massacre at Beslan in North Ossetia, urging greater cooperation in the fight against terrorism and establishing a working group to consider additional counter-terrorism measures. These new resolutions demonstrated the council's resolve in countering terrorism, but they also created potential overlap with the mission of the CTC and generated uncertainty about how the new bodies will work together.

Measuring Progress

After nearly three years of operation, the CTC has a record of considerable accomplishment in promoting counter-terrorism cooperation. Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the CTC has helped to establish political and legal authority for the global counter-terrorism effort. Most notably it has promoted the creation of specialized systems for coordinating global efforts to combat terrorist threats. The cooperative approach embodied in the UN counter-terrorism program has helped to develop and strengthen international norms. In this manner the CTC has played a role in creating and sustaining international momentum to strengthen counter-terrorism efforts.

The committee's efforts to collect information from member states on counter-terrorism capacity and implementation have been highly successful. Member state compliance with CTC reporting requests has been far greater than for any previous Security Council mandate. All 191 UN member states submitted first-round reports to the CTC explaining their efforts to comply with Resolution 1373.⁸ The committee's experts responded to these reports by requesting clarifications and additional information, which led to additional rounds of reporting. In total, the CTC has received more than 550 reports from states, making it the repository of what one observer termed "probably the largest body of information about worldwide counterterrorism capacity."⁹ The high levels of member state response to CTC requests confirm the importance many states attach to compliance with the UN counter-terrorism program. The reports indicate that many states are taking concrete steps to revise their laws and enhance their enforcement capacity for compliance with UN counter-terrorism mandates.

Graph One: Reports Submitted to the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee December 2001 – April 2004¹⁰

One of the most objective and reliable indicators of counter-terrorism compliance is the increase in the number of states joining the twelve UN counter-terrorism conventions. These conventions provide a basis for nations to cooperate in preventing terrorist financing and carrying out joint law enforcement and intelligence efforts against terrorist bombings. They also establish the legal foundation for states to harmonize criminal justice standards and negotiate mutual legal assistance agreements. The most important of these legal agreements are the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997) and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999). Both have witnessed a sharp rise in the rate of ratification since September 2001. The increase in support for the ten other UN conventions has been less dramatic, in part because several of these agreements, such as the conventions on air safety, already had broad support before September 2001. Conventions that address specific areas of terrorist activity (preventing and punishing crimes against internationally protected persons, measures against taking hostages, protecting nuclear materials, and marking plastic explosives) have had a 20 to 40 percent increase in the rate of ratification since September 2001.

The increased rate of ratification of the two main conventions has been extraordinary. In the first four years after the opening of the convention on terrorist bombings, only twenty-eight states ratified the agreement. After September 2001, an additional eighty-seven states ratified the convention, bringing the total to 115 as of May 2004. In the first two years of the convention on terrorist financing, only five states ratified the agreement, but since September 2001 102 additional nations have ratified. These results show that the United Nations has been successful in mobilizing the international community, in most regions of the world, to create a legal foundation for institutionalizing the battle against terrorism. The ratification totals are summarized in the chart below.

Graph 2: Increased Rate of Ratification of Counter-Terrorism Conventions

Complementing all this activity is a steadily increasing level of international cooperation in the counter-terrorism campaign. A majority of UN member states are now working together to coordinate international law enforcement efforts, and to deny financing, safe haven, and travel for Al-Qaida and Al-Qaida-related terrorist networks. As a result of this multilateral effort, the financial resources available to Al-Qaida may be somewhat reduced, and the operations of the terrorist network have been disrupted. Through the actions of individual countries and international agencies, approximately $200 million in potential terrorist funding have been frozen.¹¹ Through unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral law enforcement efforts in dozens of countries, more than 4,000 terrorist suspects, including many senior Al-Qaida operatives, have been taken into custody.¹² Although Al-Qaida remains a dangerous and active terrorist network, and it has received an inadvertent recruitment boost due to increased anti-Americanism following the invasion and occupation of Iraq, the international counter-terrorism program has achieved some success.

Facilitating Technical Assistance

Meeting at the ministerial level in November 2001, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1377, which encouraged the CTC to work with international, regional, and subregional organizations to explore ways in which states can receive technical, financial, regulatory, legislative, and other assistance to improve implementation of Resolution 1373.¹³ The Council recognized that relatively few countries have the extensive legal, administrative, and regulatory capacities needed to freeze financial assets, prevent the travel of designated individuals, deny safe haven to terrorists and their supporters, and suppress the recruitment and military supply of terrorist groups. Many states lack expertise even to determine their deficiencies in implementation capacity, which impedes the motivation to comply. These nations need improvements in legislation and legal authority, and better administrative machinery and equipment to implement legislative mandates.

The CTC is not an assistance provider, but it has attempted to play a role in facilitating the provision of technical aid to states that are in need of or request such help. The demand for such assistance is outpacing supply. One reason for this is that states have begun to realize the extent of their obligations under Resolution 1373 and have recognized the need for assistance in meeting these obligations. Nearly 100 countries have expressed an interest in technical assistance from the CTC.¹⁴

The requirements for implementing Resolution 1373 often involve substantial levels of training, the development of new administrative systems, and the purchase and installation of technically sophisticated equipment. Many states need help to improve policing and law enforcement systems, and to create financial regulatory mechanisms and financial intelligence units. Assistance may also be needed for the development of computerized links among security-related units, improved systems for identifying fraudulent travel documents, better mechanisms for controlling customs and immigration, and computerized equipment to screen passengers and cargo at border entry points. The following table summarizes the provision of nonlegislative technical training and assistance.

Graph 3: Provision of CT-related Technical Assistance and Training (as of 31 March 2004)¹⁵

The costs of upgrading administrative systems and acquiring and maintaining technical equipment can be substantial.¹⁶ Many states, particularly in the developing world, need help in acquiring these capabilities. As an African ambassador noted to the Security Council in July 2003, many states that have enacted counter-terrorism legislation do not have the necessary financial, technical, and human resources to implement the new laws.¹⁷ This has prompted discussion of a possible multilateral trust fund to assist such efforts. Some donor nations have indicated a desire to provide the needed assistance but lack the human resources or expertise to assess assistance needs and assure the delivery of requested help. These states prefer to coordinate their efforts through the CTC and other multilateral bodies.¹⁸ A trust fund could be of help to developing nations that need financial support to implement counter-terrorism mandates.

Many of the measures required to comply with the counter-terrorism mandates of Resolution 1373—creating more effective law enforcement capabilities; improving border, immigration, and customs controls; regulating banks and financial institutions; strengthening security at ports and border crossings—parallel the steps needed to strengthen good governance. These steps are increasingly recognized as essential to economic development and the expansion of social and economic opportunity. Trade and investment depend on stable government and the rule of law. Technical assistance measures that build governance capacity thus also advance the prospects for economic development.

This linkage between technical assistance and economic development suggests the need for integrated development aid strategies that take account of the UN counter-terrorism program. Linking the increased international commitment to counter-terrorism capacity building to the broader UN development agenda would enable the advancement of modernization and transparency in the banking, investment, and financial sectors of economies while also combating terrorism.

Enhancing International Cooperation

The CTC has facilitated outreach and coordination among a wide array of specialized international agencies and regional and subregional organizations. Attempting to enhance international cooperation is always a formidable challenge, but the mission of the CTC in this regard is truly herculean. The range of regional and international organizations with actual or potential involvement in the UN counter-terrorism mission is vast. Every region of the world is involved, and counter-terrorism programs have emerged in many regional and subregional organizations. The mandates of Resolution 1373 touch on a wide range of public activities—financing, commerce, customs, law enforcement, intelligence sharing, military recruitment, and supply—and they affect the mission of dozens of specialized agencies.

The CTC has made important strides in encouraging regional organizations to strengthen their counter-terrorism capacity. Many regional organizations have created their own counter-terrorism units, especially in Europe, the Asia-Pacific region, and Latin America. Some regions are lagging behind, however. The Middle East/North Africa region, for example, has not developed an adequate regional coordination mechanism to address the full range of counter-terrorism priorities. Broader regional coverage is also needed in South Asia and in Eastern and Southern Africa.

Improved cooperation is also needed among organizations within the UN system. The CTC has been slow to coordinate with the expert group monitoring implementation of the sanctions against Al-Qaida and the Taliban (originally mandated by Security Council Resolution 1267 in 1999). Concerns have been raised about the need for cooperation between the CTC and the committees established pursuant to Resolutions 1540 and 1566. The problem of coordination among these various bodies has not received sufficient attention. There are now four special Security Council bodies working on counter-terrorism issues: the CTC, the Al-Qaida and Taliban monitoring team, the 1540 committee, and the 1566 working group. While the mandates of these bodies are separate, they also have overlapping duties and responsibilities. The potential for the duplication of efforts under these circumstances is considerable.

Addressing Political Challenges

While many of the challenges facing the UN Counter-Terrorism Program are procedural, others are more political in nature. Among the most sensitive concerns are those related to the protection of human rights. Controversy has emerged over cases in which individuals have been detained or subjected to financial restrictions without appeal or other due process. In some cases government officials have used the fight against terrorism as a justification for suppressing long-standing dissident or minority groups, some of which have been advocates of greater democracy and human rights in their nation. More broadly, a number of analysts worry that counter-terrorism measures—greater government surveillance, increased law enforcement, tighter border controls, stricter regulation of finances—will invariably encroach upon individual and social rights and threaten basic liberties.¹⁹

UN declarations and resolutions have been unequivocal in urging strict adherence to human rights standards in the global fight against terrorism. Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated in September 2003:

There is no trade-off to be made between human rights and terrorism. Upholding human rights is not at odds with battling terrorism: on the contrary, the moral vision of human rights—the deep respect for the dignity of each person—is among our most powerful weapons against it. To compromise on the protection of human rights would hand terrorists a victory they cannot achieve on their own. The promotion and protection of human rights . . . should therefore be at the centre of anti-terrorism strategies.²⁰

At its ministerial meeting in January 2003 the Security Council adopted Resolution 1456 urging greater international compliance with UN counter-terrorism mandates but also reminding states of their duty to comply with international legal obligations, "in particular international human rights, refugee and humanitarian law."²¹

A strong case can be made that protecting human rights and strengthening democracy are essential over the long term to the fight against terrorism. Terrorist movements often arise in societies where civil and human rights are denied and opportunities for political expression are lacking.²² Protecting human rights and guaranteeing the freedom to voice dissenting views without government interference can help to prevent the rise of political extremism and terrorism.²³ Nothing will erode support for counter-terrorism mechanisms like the CTC more quickly than a perception among ordinary law-abiding citizens that such programs will inevitably compromise basic freedoms.

The most long-standing and intractable of political challenges facing the CTC is the lack of an agreed definition of terrorism within the United Nations. The definitional conundrum has entangled the UN for four decades. Some countries condemn as terrorism all acts that endanger or take innocent life, while others seek to differentiate what they consider legitimate acts of resistance against oppression. Middle Eastern states in particular have refused to support counter-terrorism initiatives that might prejudice Palestinian resistance to the Israeli occupation. It is no accident that ratification of counter-terrorism conventions and participation in CTC initiatives are lowest in the Middle East.

Thus far, the CTC has steered clear of these dilemmas by focusing primarily on procedural issues and generic counter-terrorism capabilities. It has wisely transcended the differences over competing definitions of terrorism by appealing to the consensus among UN member states that greater efforts are needed to counter the global terrorist threat posed by Al-Qaida. How long the CTC will be able to maintain this balance is subject to much debate.²⁴

Another political challenge concerns the question of enforcement. The CTC has decided not to sit in judgment of UN member states or to report to the Security Council on states it has determined to be noncompliant. This limits the committee's effectiveness by allowing certain countries to avoid responsibility for taking specific action.²⁵ If the CTC is to accomplish its mandate, this restrained practice will need to be reconsidered. In the present 'revitalized' period of UN counter-terrorism efforts, the question of what the Security Council should do about states that refuse to implement counter-terrorism mandates has become more pressing. Will the council be willing to consider the imposition of sanctions against states that have received technical assistance, yet still refuse to comply with Resolution 1373 mandates? These and other challenges comprise the tasks ahead for UN counter-terrorism efforts.