Smarting Under Sanctions

President Robert Mugabe may not know much about smart sanctions, but he is about to learn.

President Robert Mugabe may not know much about smart sanctions, but he is about to learn. The European Union, the United Kingdom and the United States are all imposing or considering targeted financial sanctions and travel restrictions against Mugabe and other leading officials if Zimbabwe continues on its present undemocratic path. March 01, 2002 By David Cortright

POLITICAL DESPOTS HAVE typically decried the harmful social impacts of sanctions, while scoffing at their political impact. In the case of Zimbabwe, however, the reverse maybe true. Precision-guided sanctions that lock down the money and prevent the travel of a few hundred officials will not cause humanitarian hardship, but they may result in substantial political gain. Certainly this is what the coalition proposing them intends.

The record of recent cases suggests that targeted sanctions have considerable potential. Although the humanitarian ordeal in Iraq clouds the public impression, that case is the exception rather than the rule.

The trend in United Nations policy in recent years has been away from general trade sanctions towards more targeted and selective measures. Since 1994 all UN sanctions have been targeted. Financial sanctions, travel bans, arms embargoes and commodity boycotts have replaced general trade sanctions as the preferred instruments of policy.

This trend has continued as part of the 'war' on terrorism. In the wake of the September 11 attacks, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1373, mandating all nations to impose targeted financial sanctions and other selective measures against terrorists and their supporters.

INNOVATIVE

The Security Council has become increasingly innovative in its use of such measures. Initially, financial sanctions were imposed only on government assets. Since 1994, however, beginning with the case of Haiti, the Council has also locked down the accounts of designated individuals and entities. Asset freezes were imposed against the Haitian military junta, UNITA leaders in Angola, and the Taliban in Afghanistan. The counter-terrorism sanctions mandated in Resolution 1373 were also directed at specific individuals and entities. The UN Secretariat develops and publishes lists of those targeted.

As the threats to global peace and security have changed, the purposes for which sanctions are imposed have steadily widened. During the 1990s sanctions were aimed at reversing aggression, restoring democratically elected governments, protecting human rights, ending wars, and bringing suspected terrorists to justice. Now two additional functions have been added: sanctioning a country for violating UN-mandated sanctions, and imposing worldwide financial and other sanctions against terrorism.

With the imposition last year of sanctions against Liberia in Security Council Resolution 1343, the international community for the first time introduced mandatory measures against one country because of its defiance of sanctions against another. Recognising Liberia's role as the primary supply base for the Revolutionary United Front in neighboring Sierra Leone, the Council imposed a diamond embargo, travel sanctions, and arms embargo against the Monrovia government. They were a form of secondary pressure against a state involved in norm violation. This was an important step towards broadening the scope of sanctions and strengthening enforcement.

Resolution 1373 has been more sweeping in its implications. This was the most far-reaching sanctions measure ever adopted by the Council. It demanded that member states take action within their borders to criminalise the financing of terror, and adopt other law enforcement and intelligence-sharing arrangements.

This was an unprecedented attempt to mandate changes in the internal law enforcement and legal procedures of UN member states. It established worldwide financial sanctions against terrorists and their supporters. The multiple mandates contained in it would, if effectively implemented and enforced, mobilise the entire international community into a sustained criminal prosecution against the financing and support of terrorist networks.

WEAKEST LINK

Travel sanctions are sometimes seen as the weak link in the cluster of options available to the international community. But President Mugabe and his associates may find that they can be quite bothersome. There can be restrictions on individual travel through visa bans, sanctions on designated airlines, or sanctions on travel to an entire country or region. In the case of Zimbabwe, the imposing states are likely to apply restrictions on the travel of particular individuals.

Travel restrictions were applied selectively in the cases of Libya, Angola, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Liberia. The economic effects have been limited but quite concentrated. They have lowered the state revenues of government-owned airlines and restricted the movement of privileged elites who travel internationally. When combined with financial sanctions, as in the case of European Union (EU) sanctions against Yugoslavia between 1998 and 2000, travel sanctions prevent government leaders and designated elites from conducting international business.

Such restrictions are unlikely to have an immediate policy impact but, over time, as in the case of Libya, they may contribute to the isolation and weakening of a targeted regime. Indeed, the partial success of travel sanctions on Libya suggests that these measures may have more impact than many have assumed. Both the isolation and restrictions may have a serious effect on Mugabe's political survival.

PRECISELY TARGETED

To be most effective, the design of each sanctions episode must be unique, based on a strategic analysis of the political, economic, and social dynamics of the targeted regime. The key to effectiveness is precise targeting and selection. They should be directed narrowly at decision-- making elites and designed to undercut loyalty to and support for the regime.

The sharpness ofthe bite is related to who feels the pain and the resultant need to make a choice. In the case of Zimbabwe, where there is a vibrant if beleaguered political opposition, sanctions should send a message of support for that opposition while attempting to isolate the regime. Because of the already severe humanitarian hardships there, restrictions should be narrowly focused on Mugabe and his supporters rather than the general public.

The EU/US sanctions against former Yugoslavia offer an important illustration ofthe principles of strategic targeting. There are multiple lessons for the application of smart sanctions against Mugabe. European officials who designed and executed these policies consciously applied the lessons from analyses of targeted financial sanctions sponsored by the Swiss government and of travel restrictions originating with the German government. The result was a sophisticated mix of smart sanctions, complemented by incentives, regularly adjusted and finetuned to changing circumstances.

Among the measures were a freeze of financial assets, a ban on new investments, a ban on export financing, an embargo on the Yugoslav airline JAT, a visa ban, a general flight ban, and an oil embargo. Some of these were general and indiscriminate, while others were more targeted and refined, especially the freeze of financial assets and the visa ban. They worked well in applying focused pressure on the regime and its key supporters.

ON THE LIST

The EU and the United States froze not only Yugoslav government assets, but also those of Slobodan Milosevic and several hundred of his closest military and political supporters and business associates. They were subject to a visa ban, which prevented them from travelling in Europe or the United States and thereby foreclosed many business and professional opportunities.

Officials drew up a list that grew from a few dozen names initially to approximately eight hundred people identified as belonging or related to the Milosevic regime and its most important political and economic support structures. Many appealed to European and US officials to be removed from the list, but they held firm to the position that targeted sanctions would be lifted only with the departure of the Milosevic regime.

These targeted coercive pressures, combined with incentives for the opposition, contributed to the groundswell against Milosevic and helped to convince elites that the costs of supporting the regime were excessive. EU officials attempted to fine-tune and adapt sanctions as a way of providing support and encouragement for the opposition.

In the case of Zimbabwe, the best policy maybe a carrot and stick approach that applies targeted pressure against designated leaders while offering benefits for opponents. Support for the opposition Movement for Democratic Change and other opposing constituencies could take many forms, including the promise of economic assistance and trade benefits.

Legislation recently approved by the US Congress calls on the President to provide debt relief and international economic aid for Zimbabwe if Mugabe's repressive policies are halted. If the regime refuses to change, however, the legislation urges the United States to impose targeted sanctions. Mugabe and his supporters could find their money locked down and their travel options severely limited. The resulting international opprobrium would deepen the growing political isolation and might help to convince Mugabe and his colleagues that democracy and human rights are preferable to smarting under sanctions.

George A Lopez and David Cortright are authors of the forthcoming International Peace Academy volume 'Sanctions and the Search for Security: Challenges to UN Action'. The Peace Academy and Chatham House are holding a conference on smart sanctions this month