Public Opinion and Nuclear Options for South Asia

September 1998 By Samina Ahmed, Amitabh Mattoo, David Cortright This article appeared in Asian Survey (September-October 1998).

The testing of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan has focused renewed attention on the nuclear arms competition in South Asia. Numerous academic studies and media reports have addressed nuclear weapons policy in South Asia, but few have examined Indian and Pakistani attitudes or the role public opinion could play in shaping policy options. This is surprising, for both countries are functioning democracies, and public opinion is an important element of governance in both countries. A policy that is inconsistent with the views of the majority will be unsustainable over the long term. Systematic evaluation of the linkages between public opinion and nuclear policy is thus long overdue and may offer new clues to restraining nuclear competition and generating stability in the region.

Many strategic analysts in New Delhi and Islamabad, especially those patronized by the government, routinely declare that "an overwhelming consensus" exists on the nuclear issue. Statements such as "no government could stand if it compromised the nuclear option" are offered regularly in both countries without supporting evidence. Apart from the surveys commissioned by the United States Information Agency (USIA) and a few hastily arranged newspaper polls lacking in methodological rigor, few attempts have been made to examine thoroughly the state of public opinion in the two countries. Nor has any effort been made to compare and contrast public thinking on nuclear weapons issues.

This article attempts to overcome this relative neglect of public opinion by presenting the findings of comprehensive polls of elite attitudes toward nuclear weapons policy in both India and Pakistan. The results of the two surveys are presented together and systematically compared, highlighting the similarities and differences of public opinion in the two countries.¹ We not only examine current attitudes but also probe the motivations that shape opinion and the considerations that might prompt respondents to think differently. Based on our analyses of the survey results, we present recommendations for policy initiatives that could advance the prospects for regional conflict resolution and bring about greater nuclear restraint and strategic stability.

The Public Opinion Surveys

The Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, in cooperation with the Fourth Freedom Forum of Goshen, Indiana, commissioned two studies of public opinion in South Asia. The first survey was conducted in India between September and November 1994 by the New Delhi-based firm, Marketing and Research Group (MARG) Pvt. Ltd. The survey consisted of face-to-face interviews with professionals and other educated elements in New Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Bangalore, Lucknow, and Hyderabad. The Pakistan survey was conducted between February and May 1996 by Salei Majid Marketing (pvt.) Ltd., a Lahore-based firm. Face-to-face interviews were conducted in eight cities: Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Lahore, Feisalabad, Peshawar, Quetta, Karachi, and Larkana. The sample size in India was 992, in Pakistan, 910. Survey respondents were randomly selected from a cross-section of educated elements representing a wide variety of professions: government and civil service, academia, science, law, journalism, medicine, business, armed forces and police, sports, and the arts. Among those interviewed were secretaries of government departments, members of parliament, university professors, directors of major laboratories, senior judges, retired and serving generals, and award-winning artists. The surveys targeted educated elements because of the influential role these groups play in shaping opinion and policy in the two countries. Although the sample was therefore biased, consisting overwhelmingly of middle and upper class men, it accurately reflects elite society in the two countries.

The two surveys, worded and structured similarly to facilitate comparative analysis, sought to answer the following questions: Are nuclear policies in India and Pakistan consonant with the opinion of educated elements? Are policy options other than those articulated by the governments of India and Pakistan supported by public opinion? Which underlying factors and motivations might influence the views of Indian and Pakistani elements? What factors or circumstances might influence elements to alter their opinions on nuclear policy? Survey respondents were divided into three categories: (a) supporters of official policy, who favored the government policy of nuclear ambiguity (that is, maintaining the capacity to produce nuclear weapons, claiming not to have manufactured or deployed such weapons while, especially in the Indian case, espousing global disarmament); (b) nuclear advocates, who supported the development of nuclear weapons; and (c) nuclear opponents, who favored the renunciation of nuclear weapons. Respondents in each of these categories were then asked about the motivations for their current attitudes and the factors that might prompt them to think otherwise. Supporters of official policy were asked what would motivate them to favor nuclear acquisition or the renunciation of the nuclear option. Nuclear advocates were asked to identify the reasons for their opinion as well as the considerations that might lead them to back away from this position. Similar questions were asked of nuclear opponents. All respondents were asked to identify situations that might justify the use of nuclear weapons, and all were asked to indicate their support for an international treaty on the elimination of all nuclear weapons. Respondents' views on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) were also recorded.

Support for the Nuclear Option

The two surveys found substantial support for current government policy in both India and Pakistan. Fifty-seven percent of those polled in India (n = 563) favored New Delhi's policy of neither confirming nor denying de facto nuclear capability while espousing global disarmament. Thirty-three percent (n = 326) were nuclear advocates, favoring weaponization and the outright acquisition of nuclear weapons. Only 8 percent (n = 83) supported renunciation of the nuclear option. In Pakistan, 61 percent of the respondents (n = 554) expressed support for Pakistan's current policy of keeping the nuclear option open, neither renouncing nuclear weapons nor acquiring them Thirty-two percent (n = 290) favored Pakistan acquiring nuclear weapons. Only 6 percent (n = 54) indicated support for the renunciation of nuclear weapons. The results of the two surveys, summarized in table 1, are remarkably similar.

Table 1: Stance on Nuclear Issues

Each of the three groups of respondents—supporters of official policy, nuclear advocates, and nuclear opponents—were asked to identify conditions that would justify their country becoming a nuclear weapons state. Respondents were not limited to a single justification. Among supporters of official policy in India, 52 percent cited threats from other nuclear powers and 48 percent referred specifically to a Pakistani nuclear test. A lesser number believed that a serious deterioration of relations with China (17 percent) or a breakdown of India's relations with the Western countries (10 percent) would justify weaponization. Thirteen percent of this group felt that no circumstances could justify the development of nuclear weapons. Among Pakistani supporters of official policy, 85 percent cited another nuclear test by India as justification for the development of nuclear weapons. Seventy-two percent cited a possible deployment by India of its Prithvi or Agni missiles, while 36 percent believed that Islamabad should develop nuclear weapons if India gained a further conventional arms advantage. Sixteen percent of the respondents in this group felt that under no circumstance should Pakistan develop nuclear weapons. These results are presented in tables 2 and 3.

Table 2: Indian Supporters of Official Policy: Circumstances Justifying the Development of Nuclear Weapons

Table 3: Pakistani Supporters of Official Policy: Circumstances Justifying the Development of Nuclear Weapons

Among nuclear advocates in India, the primary justification for going nuclear (cited by 57 percent of respondents) was the perceived threat from a nuclear-capable Pakistan. A slightly smaller percentage of the advocates believed that nuclear weapons could improve India's bargaining position in world affairs (49 percent), while 38 percent agreed with the view that nuclear weapons would enhance India's international status. Of less concern to nuclear advocates were threats from other nuclear powers (27 percent), threats from China (20 percent), or the prospect of increased international pressure on India's domestic policies (18 percent). Among Pakistani nuclear advocates, literally the only justification for going nuclear was the perceived threat from India. One hundred percent of respondents in this group expressed concern about the threat from India. Only 3 percent thought Pakistan needed nuclear weapons to improve its bargaining power in international affairs. Less than 1 percent viewed threats from other nuclear powers as justifying a decision to go nuclear. No nuclear advocate believed that Pakistan should develop nuclear weapons to protect and enhance the security of the Islamic world. These results are presented in tables 4 and 5.

Table 4: Indian Nuclear Advocates: Circumstances Justifying the Development of Nuclear Weapons

Among nuclear opponents in India, most (60 percent) said that no circumstances could justify India developing nuclear weapons. Of those willing to consider such an option, 22 percent cited threats from other nuclear powers and 10 percent identified a Pakistani nuclear test. Pakistani nuclear opponents seemed less adamant. Only 28 percent said there were no circumstances that could justify the country developing nuclear weapons. Others agreed that another Indian nuclear test or the deployment of Indian missiles could justify the development of nuclear weapons.

Table 5: Pakistani Nuclear Advocates: Circumstances Justifying the Development of Nuclear Weapons

These findings confirm that the nuclear competition in South Asia is overwhelmingly regional in nature; each side perceived military and nuclear threat from the other as the predominant justification for developing nuclear weapons. Among Indian elements, concern about the perceived threat from China, which was the original justification for the atomic bomb program, ranked well below concerns about the nuclear threat from Pakistan. This is at odds with official pronouncements from New Delhi, which emphasize the continuing nuclear threat from China as an argument against bilateral denuclearization with Pakistan. By contrast, Indian elements seemed to be worried primarily about the nuclear threat from Pakistan, with less concern about China. This may partly reflect differing perspectives and levels of knowledge between educated elements generally and government and military/intelligence officials specifically. The latter are more concerned about China's military buildup and its assistance to Pakistan's nuclear and missile programs, and thus are more likely to see Beijing as a potential threat. For the majority of Indian elements, however, a nuclear-armed Pakistan is considered a greater threat than China.

In Pakistan, the regional concern is even greater. The conventional and nuclear military threats from India are virtually the exclusive justification for the Pakistani nuclear program. Fears of India predominated over every other potential justification for the bomb program. These indications of a regional emphasis in nuclear attitudes on both sides lend credence to denuclearization strategies that focus on bilateral issues. Solutions to the problem of nuclear proliferation in South Asia lie primarily within the region itself. The government of India seeks to avoid such an emphasis by pointing to Chinese capabilities and broader international issues, but the Indian elements interviewed in our survey were predominantly concerned with regional issues. This suggests that nuclear restraint and strategic stability will depend substantially on the resolution of conflicts in Kashmir and elsewhere. Elements in the two countries differed on the larger geopolitical significance of nuclear weapons. For many respondents in India, nuclear capability was associated with enhanced international status and greater bargaining power in world affairs. As noted, nuclear advocates in India cited the prospect of improved bargaining power (49 percent) and enhanced status (38 percent) as among the most important considerations in developing nuclear weapons. In Pakistan, by contrast, nuclear weapons had little or no wider geopolitical significance. The concept of the "Islamic Bomb," evoked by former Pakistani President Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto² and widely discussed since then in the West, was found to have little resonance among Pakistani elements For Pakistanis, the bomb is a response to the perceived threat from their giant neighbor and has no relation to larger issues of global policy or Islamic solidarity.

For advocates of nuclear disarmament, the results of the surveys are disappointing. Few respondents in either country favored renouncing the nuclear option——only 8 percent in India and 6 percent in Pakistan. These numbers do not reflect the full extent of nuclear skepticism, however. The term "nuclear option" is inherently ambiguous. It suggests a capability to assemble and deploy nuclear weapons on short notice, but it also implies a reluctance to exercise that option and a skepticism about the actual use of such weapons. Even after conducting five nuclear tests in May 1998, the government of India stated that it did not intend to use these weapons and that it would be willing to abide by a comprehensive test ban on a nondiscriminatory basis. Of those supporting official policy in each country (the largest group), substantial percentages agreed that nuclear weapons should not be developed. Among Indian supporters of official policy, 13 percent agreed that "under no circumstances" would India be justified in developing nuclear weapons. Among Pakistanis in this category, 16 percent found no circumstances justifying the development of nuclear weapons. It is also worth noting that among all Indian respondents, 44 percent agreed that nuclear weapons could "never" be used. Among Pakistanis, the comparable figure was only 1 percent. In this regard, Pakistani elements seemed to be more hawkish than their Indian counterparts. On the other hand, 52 percent of all Pakistani respondents opposed a nuclear test by Pakistan, and 27 percent indicated they would oppose such a test even if India were to conduct a second one. These findings suggest that while nuclear renunciation per se is not a popular option, considerable percentages of Indian and Pakistani elements are opposed to or at least skeptical about exercising the nuclear option. The surveys asked nuclear opponents why they favored renunciation of the bomb. Among Indian opponents, the primary considerations were that "nuclear weapons are morally repugnant" (46 percent), that "nuclear weapons production harms the environment" (41 percent), and that "India cannot afford nuclear weapons" (34 percent). Among Pakistani opponents, harm to the environment was the major concern, with 80 percent citing this factor. Thirty-nine percent agreed that nuclear weapons are morally repugnant, and only 17 percent felt that Pakistan could not afford nuclear weapons. These results indicate very substantial concerns about the environmental consequences of nuclear production, especially in Pakistan. This could be an important factor in the prospects for mobilizing domestic antinuclear sentiment in the two countries, as will be discussed below.

Possible Circumstances for Nuclear Renunciation

The Kroc Institute surveys asked supporters of official policy and nuclear advocates what circumstances might prompt them to support nuclear renunciation. Among supporters of official policy in India, a majority (58 percent) said they would agree to such a step if the international community were to adopt a time-bound plan for global nuclear disarmament. Eighteen percent would not favor renouncing the nuclear option under any circumstances. Twenty-six percent would forgo the nuclear option in the event of a verifiable renunciation of Pakistan's nuclear capability. Only 15 percent believed that a final boundary settlement with China or the removal of Chinese nuclear weapons from Tibet would warrant such a move. Few would approve of such a move in exchange for a seat on the UN Security Council (12 percent), guaranteed access to technology(9 percent), or diplomatic and political support for India's position on Kashmir (8 percent). Among supporters of official policy in Pakistan, 71 percent said they would favor the renunciation of nuclear weapons if there was a final settlement with India of the Kashmir dispute. Forty-nine percent cited a reduction of India's conventional arms advantage, and 42 percent identified a verifiable renunciation of India's nuclear option. Twenty-five percent believed that Pakistan could renounce its nuclear option in the event of a global ban on nuclear tests, a freeze on the production of nuclear materials, and a time-bound plan for global disarmament. These results are presented in tables 6 and 7.

Table 6: Indian Supporters of Official Policy: Circumstances Justifying the Renunciation of Nuclear Weapons

Table 7: Pakistani Supporters of Official Policy: Circumstances Justifying the Renunciation of Nuclear Weapons

Among Indian nuclear advocates, 33 percent would never agree to renounce the nuclear option. Of those willing to consider such a possibility, 42 percent cited a global ban on nuclear testing and development as a justification for doing so. Another 18 percent mentioned a verifiable renunciation of Pakistan's nuclear option. Fewer would be motivated by a permanent seat on the Security Council (14 percent) or a final boundary settlement with China and the removal of Chinese nuclear weapons from Tibet (10 percent). Among Pakistani nuclear advocates, 87 percent cited a verifiable renunciation of India's nuclear option as a factor that could lead to Pakistan's denuclearization. Eighty-one percent identified a final settlement with India of the Kashmir dispute, and 69 percent cited a reduction of India's conventional arms advantage. Only 18 percent considered a global ban on nuclear tests and disarmament as a factor allowing for renunciation of the nuclear option.

For Indian elements, the prospect of global nuclear disarmament could have a significant impact in generating support for a renunciation of the nuclear option. New Delhi's frequent references to the idea of a time-bound plan for eliminating nuclear weapons apparently have deep resonance among Indian elements Pakistanis also support global disarmament, but their primary concerns are regional. Global nuclear reductions would have little impact on Pakistanis. For Pakistani supporters of official policy as well as nuclear advocates, renunciation of the nuclear option would depend on a settlement of the Kashmir dispute and a reduction of India's conventional military advantage.

Differences in perspectives toward nuclear weapons were also evident in responses to questions about the scale of nuclear weapons development. Nuclear advocates in each country were asked to specify the extent of nuclear weapons development they would favor. In India, 35 percent indicated support for a nuclear arsenal capable of striking potential nuclear opponents in all directions, thus revisiting De Gaulle's "tous azimuth" policy. A smaller group (19 percent) wanted India to develop an arsenal capable of striking only China and Pakistan, while 12 percent favored a capability directed against Pakistan alone. A substantial group (34 percent) wanted to develop components of a nuclear program but not actually assemble any weapons. This is another indication of skepticism toward exercising the nuclear option even among nuclear advocates. For Pakistani nuclear advocates, the emphasis was again India-centered. Ninety-six percent agreed that Islamabad should develop a nuclear arsenal capable of striking India only. Three percent expressed support for developing all components but not actually assembling nuclear weapons. Only one percent believed that Pakistan should develop a nuclear arsenal capable of striking all nuclear powers.

Several questions were asked regarding the threat of international sanctions to determine if this might be a factor influencing public opinion either for or against nuclear weapons development. This issue was included in the surveys because of frequent attempts in the West to use economic sanctions as a means of pressuring India and Pakistan to comply with nonproliferation policy objectives. Following the nuclear tests of India and Pakistan in May 1998, the US government imposed sanctions as required by the Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994. The surveys found that sanctions would have only limited effect on Indian or Pakistani attitudes. Only 6 percent of supporters of official policy in India said that sanctions would persuade them to renounce the nuclear option, and no respondents in Pakistan cited sanctions as a reason for abandoning nuclear capability. Disdain for international sanctions was plainly evident, especially in Pakistan. This may reflect the widespread resentment among policymakers and educated elements in Pakistan against the Pressler amendment and other US sanctions policies, which twice in recent decades resulted in a complete cutoff of American economic and military assistance to Pakistan. The animosity toward sanctions may also be a form of "rally-around-the-flag" effect, the often-observed phenomenon in which external coercion arouses resistance and patriotic resentment within a target nation. Sanctions may have a tendency to heighten Indian and Pakistani resistance to the powers imposing them, leading to a determination to show that sanctions will not have the intended result of preventing nuclear proliferation. Some respondents said that sanctions would make them more pro-nuclear. When supporters of official policy in India were asked if international pressure would increase their support for the nuclear option, 18 percent said yes.

The Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons

All respondents were asked when nuclear weapons could be used. As noted earlier, Indian elements registered significant reluctance in this regard, with 44 percent of all respondents citing "never." Even among nuclear advocates in India, 33 percent agreed that nuclear weapons could never be used. By contrast, only 1 percent of Pakistani respondents felt that nuclear weapons could never be used. Even among nuclear opponents in Pakistan, only 4 percent cited "never" on the question of nuclear weapons use. The Pakistan government apparently can count on broad public support should it choose to deploy nuclear weapons. This difference in public opinion between the two countries may reflect both a greater sense of insecurity in Pakistan vis-à-vis the military superiority of its giant neighbor, as well as a lack of knowledge and informed debate about the actual consequences of using these weapons.

Differences over the possible use of nuclear weapons were also evident in responses to questions about specific nuclear scenarios. Among Indian supporters of official policy, 30 percent believed these weapons could be used if Pakistan were about to take over Kashmir. Twenty-five percent favored such use if a U.S.-led coalition of forces were to intervene militarily, while 24 percent believed that atomic weapons could be used if China were about to overwhelm India militarily. Among Indian nuclear advocates, 45 percent said New Delhi should launch nuclear strikes if Pakistan were about to take over Kashmir, with 30 percent favoring nuclear use if a U.S.-led coalition of countries were to intervene militarily.

For Pakistanis, the overwhelming concern was again the prospect of an Indian military assault. Among supporters of official policy, 99 percent said that Islamabad could use nuclear weapons if India were about to attack Pakistan across the international border, while 77 percent felt that these weapons could be used if India were to intervene across Kashmir's Line of Control. Among nuclear advocates, 98 percent felt that nuclear weapons could be used if India were about to attack Pakistan across the international border, while 81 percent believed that nuclear weapons could be used if India were to intervene across the Line of Control in Kashmir. These results are presented in tables 8 and 9.

Table 8: Indian Views on When to Use Nuclear Weapons

Table 9: Pakistan's Views on When to Use Nuclear Weapons

Curiously and alarmingly, very few respondents in either country felt that nuclear weapons use might occur accidentally. Only 4 percent in India and 1 percent in Pakistan agreed that nuclear weapons could be used by accident. This contrasts with the opinion of many nuclear policy experts, who believe that inadvertent or accidental use of nuclear weapons is a very serious concern and that this danger is especially acute in threshold countries where nuclear command and control systems are not as elaborate as in the major nuclear weapons states. The evident lack of concern about the possibility of accidental use of nuclear weapons in South Asia may reflect the inadequacy of public discourse on these issues and the lack of authoritative information on the risks associated with these weapons. The nuclear weapons programs of both countries are shrouded in secrecy and ambiguity, and reliable information about the security, economic, environmental, and other consequences of these programs is largely unavailable.

Kroc Institute survey results contain evidence of such a lack of knowledge about the nuclear programs. Respondents in both countries were asked about the availability of information on nuclear issues. Only 1 percent of the respondents in Pakistan and 13 percent in India were of the opinion that information was easily available. Twenty-one percent of respondents in India and nearly 50 percent of Pakistanis believed that information on nuclear issues is difficult to get. Six percent in India and nearly 20 percent in Pakistan believed that information on nuclear issues is almost impossible to obtain.

Views on Arms Control and Disarmament

The idea of global nuclear disarmament has immense legitimacy and support among the Indian and Pakistani elite. Among all respondents, a whopping 94 percent in India and 97 percent in Pakistan expressed total or partial support for an international agreement to ban nuclear weapons, with only 1 percent opposed in India and none in Pakistan. Among supporters of official policy in India, 88 percent indicated total support for the elimination of nuclear weapons, with an additional 9 percent expressing partial support, for a combined 97 percent endorsement for nuclear abolition. In Pakistan, 71 percent expressed total support, while 27 percent gave partial support, for a combined 98 percent. Even among nuclear advocates, support for a nuclear ban was widespread, with 91 percent in India and 95 percent in Pakistan indicating full or partial support for a global disarmament agreement These results are presented in table 10. Respondents also expressed high confidence in the feasibility of such an agreement, with 62 percent in India and 97 percent in Pakistan believing that a global ban on nuclear weapons could be signed within 20 years.

Indian and Pakistani Support for International Agreement Eliminating Nuclear Weapons

On issues of limited arms control and nonproliferation, however, the picture is very different. Policymakers and elements in South Asia have been highly skeptical of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and in recent years have also refused to support the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the proposed ban on fissile material. India and Pakistan are among only a handful of countries that have refused to sign the NPT, which was indefinitely extended with the support of 183 nations in May 1995. India has condemned the treaty as discriminatory, and Pakistan has tied its acceptance of the treaty to Indian accession. The surveys found very little support in either country for unilateral accession to the treaty (13 percent in India, less than 1 percent in Pakistan). On the other hand, bilateral accession to the treaty had considerable backing, especially in Pakistan. In India, 26 percent of all respondents said they would endorse New Delhi signing the NPT bilaterally with Pakistan. Ninety-one percent of respondents in Pakistan agreed that Islamabad should sign the treaty if India does the same.

Policy Implications

For the governments of India and Pakistan, the findings of the surveys appear at first glance to offer some encouragement. A clear majority of educated elements in both countries expressed support for the nuclear status quo. The policy of ambiguity, neither confirming nor denying de facto nuclear capability while espousing support for disarmament, enjoyed broad backing. Yet substantial numbers also favored overt nuclearization, indicating a considerable base of potential support for more assertive nuclear policies. Indeed, political leaders in both countries have been pressed in recent years to adopt more hard-line positions. This is evident in India's rejection of the CTBT in 1996 (despite the fact that New Delhi had championed such an agreement for more than 40 years). This hardening of attitudes is also reflected in the electoral success of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which has openly espoused nuclear deployment. Once in power, the BJP government quickly took the first step toward fulfilling its pledge to induct nuclear weapons into India's armed forces. In Pakistan as well, a hardening of attitudes was evident even before the decision to match India's nuclear tests. The position of the nuclear hawks in Pakistan has been strengthened following the nuclear tests of May 1, 1998. Both countries are continuing to press ahead with the development of ever more sophisticated weapons capabilities and also the systems to deliver them

The survey findings confirm the profound dangers posed by the present political differences and nuclear competition between India and Pakistan. Of special concern is the apparent overwhelming willingness in both countries to resort to the use of nuclear weapons if necessary. International analysts have frequently asserted, as the director of the US Central Intelligence Agency observed in 1993, that the arms race between India and Pakistan represents "the most probable prospect for the future use . . . of nuclear weapons."³ The seeming intractability of the hostility between the two countries, evident in the public's apparent readiness to employ nuclear weapons, corroborates this judgment. Change is desperately needed if India and Pakistan are to avoid nuclear confrontation and move toward accommodation and regional cooperation.

New Directions

The sources of political change must be both internal and external. Internally, a more democratic and informed debate will be essential if current assumptions are to be challenged and new possibilities opened for political change. The international community can encourage the process of change by providing targeted incentives that reward steps toward accommodation and dialogue. The major nuclear powers can also aid the process by taking concrete steps toward accelerated denuclearization and the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.

Domestic political change within India and Pakistan will depend on greater public recognition not only of the security risks of current nuclear policy but of the enormous economic costs and environmental dangers involved. The two countries are burdened with appalling poverty and underdevelopment. Pakistan and India rank 134th and 135th respectively on the Human Development Index of the United Nations Development Program, below such countries as Zimbabwe and El Salvador. Adult illiteracy is 63 percent in Pakistan and 49 percent in India.⁴ Hundreds of millions live in abject poverty. Yet the two countries, especially Pakistan, pour considerable resources into military preparedness, maintaining two of the largest armies in the world and developing extensive nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. The Kroc Institute surveys show that issues of poverty and economic instability have higher salience than nuclear weapons concerns. This suggests that an emphasis on reordered spending priorities to address urgent social and economic needs might find substantial popular support. The security debate should be reformulated to focus on the internal threats to stability posed by poverty, communalism, and ethnic and religious strife. A diffusing of bilateral tensions would allow each side to shift resources from military and nuclear priorities to meeting human needs and improving social development.

Environmental concerns could also be important in altering the context of the nuclear debate. The surveys found considerable concern about potential environmental harms associated with nuclear energy, especially in Pakistan. In India, 60 percent of all respondents agreed that nuclear energy has "high environmental costs attached"; in Pakistan 92 percent agreed with this statement. In Pakistan 70 percent agreed that the costs of nuclear energy outweigh the benefits. The depth of concern about the environmental risks of nuclear energy, especially in Pakistan, could serve as a potential foundation for challenging the current directions of nuclear policy. International linkages could be crucial to the debate on environmental issues, since information about the environmental hazards of nuclear energy is practically unavailable in South Asia. The evident concern that nonetheless exists is partly the result of information from external sources, especially in Europe and North America, where the debate on environmental nuclear hazards is extensive. The external discourse on these issues can influence opinion within South Asia.

A new approach is needed to US nonproliferation policy in the region. Past US sanctions against India and Pakistan may have slowed the pace of development, but they have not prevented the testing of nuclear weapons and the acquisition of overt nuclear weapons capability. The new sanctions imposed in the spring of 1998 are unlikely to result in a rollback of nuclear capability and may only create further resentment at the inconsistencies and discriminatory patterns of US policy. The attempt to maintain a two-tiered international system in which the US and other nuclear powers cling to their weapons while attempting to deny this capability to others has not succeeded in South Asia and is unlikely to work as the long-term basis for nonproliferation policy.

To influence the prospects of denuclearization in South Asia, the US and its nuclear power peers must lead by example in accelerating the disarmament process. As the survey results indicate, Indian and Pakistani elements take the idea of global disarmament seriously. For Indian elements especially, a commitment on the part of the major powers to negotiate the elimination of nuclear weapons could have a decisive impact in persuading public opinion to reconsider the nuclear option. Such a commitment is essential to the global nonproliferation regime. Article VI of the NPT specifically commits the nuclear powers to negotiate a plan for global nuclear disarmament. India and Pakistan have long insisted, rightly in our view, that the failure of the nuclear powers to fulfill this commitment is a violation of the original nonproliferation bargain, and that a discriminatory regime of nuclear haves and have nots is not an equitable basis for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. As a recent report of the US National Academy of Sciences notes, the nuclear states "cannot be confident of maintaining indefinitely a regime in which they proclaim nuclear weapons essential to their security while denying all others the right to possess them"⁵

The US and the other major powers have committed themselves on numerous occasions to the goal of nuclear weapons elimination, most recently at the NPT extension conference in New York in May 1995. As part of the agreement that led to unanimous support for indefinite extension of the treaty, these nuclear weapons states approved a document, Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, that recommitted them to the goal of global nuclear disarmament. The document reaffirmed Article VI of the NPT and specifically promised the "determined pursuit by the nuclear weapons states of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons."⁶ Failure to fulfill these commitments "undermines the authority of the United States and other nuclear weapons states in combating proliferation," argues the National Academy of Sciences report.⁷ Many other experts and former military officials have made the same point. In December 1996, General George Lee Butler, former commander in chief of the US Strategic Command, joined with dozens of other retired general officers from around the world to call for the abolition of nuclear weapons.⁸ In February 1998 more than 100 civilian political leaders, including 47 present or former heads of state, issued a similar call for deep cuts and the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

Progress toward fulfillment of the NPT's disarmament pledges would significantly advance the international nonproliferation agenda and could have a dramatic impact on the nuclear debate in South Asia. It is time for the US and the other nuclear weapons states to put forward a technologically and politically sound blueprint for moving forward in a step-by-step process toward the elimination of nuclear weapons in the shortest possible time line. The outlines of such a plan were developed in 1996 by the prestigious Canberra Commission and have been further developed in a draft Nuclear Weapons Convention approved by the UN General Assembly in December 1997. An initiative by major powers to begin negotiating such a plan, and an invitation for India and Pakistan to sit at the table and join the process, would dramatically transform the dynamics of the nuclear competition in South Asia and the world. Global developments and more enlightened policies by the United States can aid the denuclearization process, but the primary impetus for change must come from within the region itself. As noted earlier, the dominant motivations for the nuclear option are regional in nature: India's distrust of China and fears of a nuclear-armed Pakistan, and Pakistan's concerns about the military threat from its giant neighbor. These enmities are most starkly revealed in the crucible of Kashmir, but they are evident in numerous other military and political disputes within the region. Until these fears and animosities are tamed, people on both sides will feel the need for a nuclear option, and attempts at denuclearization will falter. As the history of the cold war and its ending showed, political differences between East and West fueled the nuclear competition, not the other way around. It was only when political animosities began to subside during the Gorbachev era that nuclear and conventional arms reduction became possible. In South Asia as well progress toward denuclearization will require an easing of enmity and an increase in political cooperation and trust.