

many more, both in the scholarly world and in the real one Martin writes about so astutely.

Justice and Reconciliation: After the Violence. By Andrew Rigby. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001. 207p. \$49.95 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

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Much of the growing literature on human rights issues focuses on the post-1989 democratizations and the ethnic conflicts of the 1990s. It reaches across many disciplines, including work not just by political scientists but also by legal scholars, historians, sociologists, anthropologists, journalists, and practitioners. Much of the literature confronts the tension between the pursuit of justice and the pursuit of stability. Andrew Rigby, who teaches on forgiveness and reconciliation, contributes an eclectic and good-hearted meditation on the dilemma of political reconciliation after mass atrocities.

Rigby considers a number of different ways of coming to terms with the past: forgetting about it; holding trials or simple purges; setting up a truth commission; paying reparations. He briefly considers the effect of these various options as they have played out in different cases: Germany and Western Europe after World War II, Spain after the Franco dictatorship, Chile after Pinochet, Argentina after the "dirty war," Eastern Europe after communism, South Africa after apartheid, and others. His goal is the creation of "a new culture of respect for human difference and human rights—what some might term a culture of peace as opposed to a culture of violence" (p. 183).

The book reveals an intelligent skepticism about all these policy options; for instance, some Latin American truth commissions were not allowed to single out perpetrators by name (p. 9). "There is an ongoing tension between the need for truth, the quest for justice, and the desire for peace" (p. 12). Justice is not an absolute value for Rigby; it does not trump all other political concerns. More specifically, following Samuel P. Huntington's *The Third Wave* (1991), Rigby argues that "wherever the transition has been negotiated rather than imposed, some kind of amnesty is almost inevitable, particularly if the parties to the settlement continue to possess the capacity to shatter the peace" (p. 184).

Rigby does not just think this tradeoff is inevitable; he suggests that it may, perversely, be helpful. His most intriguing argument is that dwelling on terrible events in the past may not be a wise way to deal with them: "I am not convinced of the appropriateness of opening up the past and talking about it as a means of dealing with the hurt" (p. 1). He even notes that he has lost loved ones in terrible circumstances: "I will not forget them; to do so would dishonor them in some way. But I do not want the pain of those times to come back" (p. ix). This runs contrary to the therapeutic argument popular among some human rights advocates, who see truth commissions and trials as cathartic opportunities for the surviving victims to face and thereby overcome past traumas.

But Rigby does not always stick to these guns. Toward the end of the book he also argues that victims need to be "heard and validated" in order for members of a shattered society to build "a new definition and relationship that acknowledges difference but on the basis of a shared identity as survivors and as human beings" (p. 186). He also suggests that France has been too quick to close the book on its Vichy past, and Spain was wrong to engage in "a collective exercise in public amnesia" (p. 54) about Franco's regime in order to proceed with the establishment of parliamentary democracy. This sounds more like the therapeutic argument he earlier seemed to be against. In a splendid book, *Unspeakable*

Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity (2001), Priscilla B. Hayner gives a more sustained and richer account of the difficulties of pursuing truth, and she points out it is not clear whether truth commissions provide the kind of therapeutic effects that Rigby sometimes attributes to them.

Unlike Hayner, Rigby relies almost exclusively on secondary sources. There is always a potential tradeoff between depth and breadth. The liveliest chapter is the only one for which he has done primary work: on Palestinians accused of collaborating with Israel. He condemns the internecine violence among Palestinians, many of whom are targeted for personal rather than political reasons, as "the worst kind of lynch law" (p. 147; see also Mark Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 1994, pp. 747–8, and Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S. Migdal, *Palestinians: The Making of a People*, 1993, p. 268). For the rest of the cases, Rigby covers a lot of ground in a relatively slender book, which shows a laudable ability to synthesize broadly; but this comes at the expense of digging more deeply into the cases.

This book adds to a growing discussion. The question of the therapeutic effects of trials is one that might usefully be supplemented by the work of psychologists, as well as by a reconciliation specialist such as Rigby, all of them joining in what is increasingly a multidisciplinary area for study.

Appeasement in International Politics. By Stephen R. Rock. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2000. 237p. \$29.95.

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Since Neville Chamberlain's concessions to Adolph Hitler in Munich in 1938, appeasement has become a term of disrepute. The word is almost an epithet, denoting weakness in the face of aggression. Generations of scholars and policymakers have learned the lesson that appeasement emboldens the aggressor and makes war more likely. Academic attention has focused instead on deterrence theory and the role of coercion and compellence as key elements of international politics.

In recent years scholarly interest in inducement policies has been rekindled. Stephen R. Rock's new book is an important contribution to this emerging literature. Rock challenges the assumption that concessions do not work, and that hostile leaders cannot be appeased. He reminds us that appeasement was once an accepted practice of European diplomacy and was considered an effective means of reducing tensions and removing the causes of conflict. Through analyses of five cases—British concessions to the United States in the late 1890s, the appeasement of Germany before World War II, the Anglo-American acceptance of Soviet demands at Yalta, the American "tilt" toward Iraq in the late 1980s, and the use of incentives that led to the 1994 Agreed Framework containing North Korea's nuclear program—Rock offers lessons on the benefits and limitations of conciliatory strategies. He develops theoretical propositions and policy guidelines to aid scholars and policymakers in assessing the merits of inducement policies.

As Rock notes, appeasement is a subcategory of the broader concept of engagement. He acknowledges that engagement is a more widely accepted term among scholars and policymakers. Engagement is the more encompassing concept, referring to the building of longer-term cooperation. Appeasement tends to be narrower in scope, referring to concessions that remove the causes of conflict and reduce tensions. Because Munich still casts such a long and dark shadow, it would be best to subsume the analysis of appeasement under the general heading of engagement. A book with the word appeasement in the title is inherently handicapped.

This is unfortunate, for there is much insight and wisdom in Rock's compact volume.

Rock catalogs the various purposes that appeasement policies may serve, the mechanisms by which inducements exert influence, and the factors that account for success or failure. Inducements may seek to preserve the status quo—through crisis resolution and prevention—or to alter conditions—by offering political tradeoffs and developing alliances. The four mechanisms by which such policies reduce tensions are satiation, reassurance, socialization, and altering political dynamics within the adversary regime. Incentive policies, like sanctions, are an attempt to influence the political debate within a target or recipient regime by strengthening the hand of advocates of cooperation, while weakening the position of hostile factions. These internal influences are most likely to occur where some degree of pluralism exists.

While it is true that war-seeking states cannot be appeased, most countries that engage in hostile behavior are pursuing objectives that can in theory be appeased. Rock draws a major distinction between hostile policies that are driven by greed—a state's pursuit of territory, resources, or commercial advantage—and those that are security-driven—when a nation is motivated by concerns for its safety. Rock's characterization of these motives and how they function in different cases is not always convincing—nor is his attempt to define the circumstances in which incentives should be conditioned on reciprocity and accompanied by threats. Rock argues that when the adversary is motivated by greed, inducement policies should be conditional and combined with coercive measures. When the adversary is motivated by insecurity, inducements should be offered without the requirement for reciprocity and without accompanying threats. These are innovative propositions, but they have little grounding in Rock's case studies. They are based more on what he terms their "logic" than on hard empirical evidence. These propositions may be valid in some circumstances, but they need more thorough testing than Rock offers in his study.

The nature of inducements and how they are perceived by the adversary are crucial to the chances of success. Inducements must be properly directed to address the goals and motivations of the adversary. They should be delivered as much as possible to the supporters of reform rather than hostile factions. They must be of sufficient scale to satisfy the adversary. Finally, the state or coalition offering incentives must send clear signals and have a reputation for fulfilling its commitments. Mixed or confused messages and a failure to deliver on promised incentives can undermine effectiveness. As Rock notes, the hesitation and slowness of the United States in fulfilling its promises under the 1994 Agreed Framework have impeded progress in freezing Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program and slowed efforts to tackle ballistic missile testing and other contentious issues.

Inducement policies carry significant risks. They may be perceived by the adversary as a sign of weakness and may lead to further attempts to extract concessions. The adversary may become more daring and aggressive in pursuit of its hostile objectives. Rock argues that this is more likely in a regime that is motivated by greed than by insecurity, although his evidence in support of this claim is limited. Rock is on firmer ground when he identifies means for avoiding this moral hazard. A state can diminish the chances of being perceived as weak by making concessions conditional on reciprocal cooperation, by establishing a reputation for firmness and strength, and by maintaining the materiel capability to employ deterrent or coercive strategies if conciliatory gestures fail. In the case of North Korea, the United States and its South Korean and Japanese partners offered incentives on a step-by-step basis and made the delivery of

benefits conditional on reciprocal cooperation from the other side.

Rock's case studies and theoretical propositions significantly advance our understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of inducement strategies in the conduct of international affairs. The book has limitations, including an overreliance on the distinction between greed and insecurity as motivations for hostile behavior, but its strengths far outweigh its weaknesses. Rock has confirmed, as other scholars have demonstrated, that engagement strategies can be and have been successful in advancing international cooperation.

Vehicle of Influence: Building a European Car Market. By Roland Stephen. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000. 240p. \$49.50.

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The significance of European integration as a process and an intellectual focus is undeniable. The economic importance of the European auto sector and its worldwide dimensions are also self-evident. Roland Stephen's effort to deepen our analytical understanding of the former through a detailed examination of the latter thus promises to be of interest to readers from a variety of fields, ranging from economics and politics to the analysis of corporate strategy.

Stephen acknowledges that no single, parsimonious theory is adequate to explain the complex trajectory of the development of the European Union (EU). Indeed, he gives short shrift to many of the traditional theoretical approaches to European integration, particularly the neofunctionalist or spill-over theory long identified with Ernst Haas. Stephen offers instead an analytical framework based on an eclectic set of insights and propositions taken from well-known theories of regulation, policy formation, and institutional analysis. Its key elements are the perceived distribution of the costs and benefits of integration across auto firms and member states as well as the institutional arena in which policy initiatives are debated and decided. The meat of the book is the application of the framework to four key issue areas: setting common standards for permissible levels of auto emissions, reducing national government subsidies to auto firms, antitrust policy toward the auto sector, and developing an EU-wide voluntary export restraint (VER) system with Japan to replace the hodge-podge of national restraints.

Stephen's framework can produce very plausible explanations of policy outcomes. For example, in the case of auto emissions, different firms specialized in different propulsion technologies and were divided because the costs of potential regulations would fall more heavily on some firms than others. National governments were also divided, because some felt more environmental political pressure than others. Policymaking shifted to the European Parliament and eventually resulted in higher common emissions standards than most auto companies would have preferred. In the case of Japanese imports and transplants, the auto companies were united in their reluctance to accept complete openness to what they perceived as unbeatable (and perhaps unfair) competition. Some national governments were more liberal in theory than others, but none was willing or able to put together an open auto trade coalition in the face of determined industry opposition. Policymaking remained very informal, and the result was a variant of the European tradition of managed trade in the form of a complex Europe-wide VER with Japan, which was "an antiliberal outcome . . . imposed on consumers and importers" (p. 19).

In his cases the author makes good use of interviews with European auto industry officials, lobbyists, and Brussels